IMGpapers 1968–75

Newspapers of the International Marxist Group and its forerunners, 1968–75

THE PRICE OF 'RECONSTRUCTION'

Red Weekly No. 28, 23 November 1973 · p. 5 of the scan · 1,764 words

The scan: rw-no28-nov-13-1973.pdf (PDF, Marxists Internet Archive, opens at this page)

Uncorrected machine reading. This text was read by machine (Apple Vision OCR) from a scan of a newspaper page, and the page was cut into articles by machine, at the headlines found by their type size. Nothing has been corrected: expect misread words, text from a neighbouring article, and titles that are the machine reading of the headline, some of them only fragments. Quote from the scan, not from this page.
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page 5 of the scan

ready to intervene. On the night of 10 September, there was no 'state of emergency" in the Socialist Party, either in the provinces or in Santiago.

TOTAL PARALYSIS The same goes for the Communist Party and the militants of the other parties which made up Popular Unity. Not that the contrary would probably have altered the outcome of the coup for in a defeat of the scale which the Chilean working class has just suffered, the cause was obviously not a technical question. The cause must be found in the political and strategic orlentation of the parties concerned. But such preparation would probably at least have prevented the deaths of innumerable political militants, the deaths of innumerable worker militants who paid with their lives for the total paralysis of the parties of the left during the first hours of the coup. This was the actual situation on the morning of 1l September, even several hours before the fall of the Moneda Palace, These parlies were paralysed and unable to function, with their leaders and nuttants all over the place in a lown closely patrolled by the potice. The first to draw the lesson of events, but in what a way, were the leaders uf the of the Political Bureau managed to get together before the morning was out. Afler a brief meeting, they gave the order for the party to go underground. In the first weeks after the coup, the junta succeeded in deceiving large sections of workers about its determination to make the working masses pay an extremely high price for the reconstruction of Chilean capitalism.

The official declarations of the first few days were akea rather more seriously than one would hav expected, particularly those which talked about the generals" desire 'not to reture to the past, to maintain social gains, to improve food supplies, to protect the rights of the workers", etc. One week after the coup d'etat, when transport (80% strikebound for more than six weeks) was once more functioning normally, wages for the ght in September were paid. At the the junts published a list of officially approved prices for the main essential inced that harsh measures would gainst those who didn't stick to these prices, and put onto the market supplies of certain rare goods (Nestle products, cream, sugar, ete.) which the State organs of distribution had previously tried to control in order to ensure a fairer allocation Moreover, all the private producers, all the distributors, who themselves had stocks of these goods, were forced to put them on sale, in a fine "display of patriotism'.

CRUCIAL PERIOD Thus for two or three weeks, in most of the lowns at least, large sections of the population were able to buy condensed milk, Nescafe, cream. meat (even beef), cigarettes (without having to ueue for half an hour), rice, sagar, ete, In this crucial period for the junta, when in order to consolidate its potition it had at least to neutralise the masses who had supported Popular Unity, the appearance in the shops of goods which were formerly rare or even non-exisient played a very important role, as did the immediate and almost complete disappearance of the black market. One should also remember that this gigantic opceation was accompanied by a frenzied campaign of hate in which every captured militant was presented as a suicidal extremist, a corrupier morals, a 'swindler", a criminal well known to the police": each leader of Popular Unity was coused of stealing thousands of dollars of State money, of having hoarded tons of sugar, butter, etc, of having kept dozens of mistresses, of having maintaipod arveral luxurious country houses where "innumerable orgies took place'; each Centre for Agrarian Reform became a 'guerrilla training area*: each factory canteen became a 'stockpile of provisions in preparation for the civil war which Popular Unity was about to launch tan old sword hung on the wall became an arms depol": a houschold fast-aid box became an 'underground hospital'; and so on.

The daily denunciation, through every possible and to wait so, aids were e did of fail to have an effect and ease the way for the most savage repression which has ever followed a Latin American coup.

ur the junta, time hurries on. Their fundament im is obviously to rebuild Chican capitalian. Thi wage packet.

cate of exchange with the dollar'! two hours extra a day. wete bought by the State!

junta: the prices offensive. untrue, anyway). means, as quickly as possible, a inasaive increase in investment. particularly foreign investment, which in turn requires a certain climate of confidence together with a high rate of profit. Politically, this means the outlawing of all working class organisations (which has been done), the dissolution of the trade unions (also done), the liquidation of the leaders of these organisations at all levels (which is being energetienily pursued by the ammed forces): on the economic plane, it means the immediate reduction of the buying power of the wages, sky-high price rises, an extension of working houts, the return of hundreds of factories to their former owners, and the sacking of thousands of The freeze on any kind of wage increase came first, before the rash of price rises, at a tome when the mass of employees had just got their first September The scond measure devaluation passed practically unnoticed. No-one in Chile talked of a devaluation. It was simply a question of an adjustment in the The ectension of working hours was accompanied by a big press campaign. At first, Chilean workens wete asked to make a 'voluntary' effort in order to assist the 'rebuilding of the country', Alter ten days or a fortnight of an intensive campaign on this question, the junta published a decree ending the five-day week, making it compulsory to work four hours on Satunday, and furthermore giving employers option of "proposing" to their workers The return of the factories has not as yet been completed, The general principles have been worke out. In the near future, the process will unfol whereby hundreds of factories ationalised by the Allende government will be returned to the private sector, including some even whose shares PRICES OFFENSIVE In the second week of Uctober began the most "delicate phase of the "urgent programme" of the useleiL After previously announcing a freeze on all wage increases, the prices offensive was preceded by a short press campaign, shrill and confused, which announced that in view of the need to readjust the prices of some articks, the junta had deckied that there should be Ene monthly wage packets in the three months from October to December, as well as a bonus, which together would mean a wage increase of 90%, This campaign wa onducted under the dramatic alogan: "You won't be able to find a wage anywhere below 12,000 escudos a month (which is completely To get this aspect of things in perspective, it is necestary to go back a little. From October 1972 to mid-September 1973, the increase in the cost of living came to a little under 300%. However, it should be remembered that the index by which it is calculated dates from the time of the Frei government, since Parliament always refused to of a middle class family, which don't hear much relation to those of a working class family. Last April, a general wage increase of 60% was legally ratified. A further lacrease bould have come into force in October, this time of 150% in order bo allow workers to catch up with the increase in the cost of living. But at the end of September, despite the official increase in the cost of living of 300% Kince Oclober 1972, wage levels were only at 160% of their October 1972 figure.

The purchasing power of the Chilean masses had therefore fallen, at least theoretically, by about 50%. However, the Allende government fixed the prices of the goods most in demand by the low-paid workers (more than 70% of the workforce) at a very low level, so that they did not suffer too much from the overall dedias in purchasing power. In fact, nearly all the most esential food items escaped the general iecrease in prices during the year, except for some which were affected by the transport strike (eg potatoes).

CATASTROPHIC

Since the prices offensine unleashed by the junta in October ('a relurn to real prices"), the lose in the workers purchasing power has reached cutastrophic proportions, particularly as it is the most esential goods which live been nost affected. To give a few examples: hread has risen by 207%, milk by 328%, sugar by 380%, tea by 600%, ooffee by 1233% It is therefore impossible to make any accurate calculation of the increase in the cost of living in October, although it is probably 300 to 40056 higher than in the provioes month. The purclusing power of the workers in October amounted to unly 10% of what it was at the start of the year. The wage increases decreed by the junta will only start to be paid towards the end of November, and they will only double the parchasing power in October, in raise it from 10 to 20% of its previous level! All these calculations are of course very rougli. To give a concrete idea of the tragic situation in which the Chilean workers find themsehes today, the fotowing example is perhaps mon The review Alimentacion, official journal of the ultra-reactionary National Agricultural Society, Isid out in its August issue a series of menus for the week, providing the variety and quantity of food which would give an adult person the minimumn necessary amount of calories and proteins. in following this plan, an adult person woukl spond-taking account of the new prices in force between 7,500 and 8,500 escudos a monti. Wit the fuel to cook these meals costing another 3,100 cacudos, this person woukd spend in a month, just to feed his or her self, mote than the income of 883h t Chilean workers!

Provided that this adult lived in the open air, naked, went to bed with the sun, dida't amoke, didn't drink, was never ill, moved only on foot (or didn't move at ull), washed with water only, gave up the cinera and everything else... he or she could easily attor the calories and protcins necessary for survival, as long as they were cooked hu the best of the win. and as bond as he dr she wasn't one of the 30% or wo of workers who get less than 6,500 cacudos!

← THE DILEMMA OF POPULAR member of the editorial board of our French sister paper Rouge, recently returned from Chile after being sent there immediately following the coup. During his stay, he had discussions not only with in Chile, but also with militants of the various parties which made up Popular Unity, as well as with the leaderships of the organisations of the Chilean vanguard—in particular, the MIR. Here he looks at the parties of Popular Unity.Moves to co-ordinate Scottish solidarity action →

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