In the story of the last days of the Popular Unity government, there was one little known but crucial development: a split between the various groups making up Popular Unity became more or less a reality on the evening of Saturday, 8 September.
That day the leaderships of the different parties met together under the chairmanship el Salvador Allende. It was not a moment for doubts or hesitation, The economic, social and political crisis brought on by the sabotaging activities of the bourgeoisie and the Imperialists had reached such a stage thatextremely urgent measures were required: in a few days time, for example, there would be no more bread in Santiago-stocks of flour were running out, the lorry-owners strike was compietely effective, and no currency was available to make any purchases from abroad. A few days more, and this totally paralysed country would be in the grip of famine. Something had to be done with the utmost speed, particularly as rumours of an impending military coup were gathering momentum. The Communist Party was the most aggressive . . in these closed confines: it demanded the immediate opening of negotiations with the Christian Damocras and turther in the next few hours, that the Christian Democrats should be invited to join the Government. As for the harsh conditions laid down by the Christian Democrats? We will have to accept them all, more or less. It is the only way to win back the confidence of the middle classes, said the general secretary of the Communist Party during the meeting.
END OF EXPERIMENT In point of fact, acceprance of the conditions laid down by the Christian Democrats for entering any new coalition would clearly have meant the end of Popular Unity and the kind of reformist experiment which it represented. What were the main demands of the Christian Democrats? A return to 'order" was the first, ie an end to the workers" and peasants' mobilisaJons, Ising repression iT necessary, Industry must be set moving again the factory occupajons must he ended, and a period of intensive production cas consed. Those factories whose nationalisation hadn't been formally agreed must be returned to their previous Janers. There must be strict, guaranteed imits on the extent of the agrariao reform. n the sector which would remain nafionalised, he committees for the mobilisation and selfirgunisation of the workers must be dissolved nd replaced with a kind of participation.
n fact, it would have meant a retuen lo the most moderate kind of bourgeois reformism, with the kind of measures proposed by Tomic, the Christian Democrat candidate against Allende in the presidential elections of 1970. That is what the Chilean CP was fighting for on Saturday, 8 September to save what is most important, as Corvalan was to repeat several times during the meeting. Furthermore, in reiation to the lony-owners strike, the Communist Party Insisted on a policy of clemency once order was restored and the middle classes reassured, No nicasuros must be taken against the trouble makers! In putting forward such an onentation, the Communist Party clearly defined itself as the right wing of Popular Umity-the right wing. inasmuch as it was ready to make any and every concession to win back the contidenco of the bourgeoisic, big and small.
ARM THE WORKERS Supporting it in such an orientation were the Radical Party (affiliated to the Socialist International), and the section of MAPU (Movement for United Popular Action) led by Gazmuri. Opposed to it was the Socialist Party, or rather its general secretary Altamirano, who relied for his position on the support of the left wing, the revolutionary sections inside the Socialist Party, as well as getting support from the MIR. For him, it was ло ог nev. The next day he was to come out with it in a particularly belligerent speech at the National Stadium. It is out of the question, he said, to negotiate with the enemy and its representative, Christian Democracy. Only an increased mobilisation of the working class, arming them against the fascist attacks, together with a solemn appeal to the soldiers to line up with the worken, can throw back the military and reaction in general.
This general analysis was well-founded and correct. However, in some ways it was irresponsible, For Altamirano proposed no concrete steps to the workers, only brave words.
The mobilisation of the working class must. be stepped up? Bur on what basis? With what central specific aims? The workers must be armed? But why only as a defensive measure? And how? What arms? Who would drill them?
To all these questions, basic to any such orientation, Altamirano gave no answer. He remained as vague and woolly as the party which he led, and which would in any case have prevented him from taking the lead in such a terclulionary procons. In relation lo the lorry-owners, Allantruno defended the idea of a lough policy, with layers.
SEMBLANCE OF UNITY became more and more pressing.
had become a reality. Popular Unity rally: Altamirano with glasses, and Corvalan on his left measures which would make un exarople of them. The government must in this way sbow its determination and its authority to deal with those reactionary petty bourgeois Between these two extremes, Allende tried to steer a middle course, borrowing clements from each, He was forn certain toughness with the lorry-owners, and for the opening of negotiations with the Christian Democrats, altbough he was in favour of driving a hard bargain with them. He proposed at the same time to negotiate once more for a military presence in the government. In this be was supported by the right wing of the Socialist Party and the section of MAPU led by Garreton (or at least its representatives at the mecting!.
up.
It was not much, but be was in a strong position, for he alone could maintain a semblance of unity among a divided left, forn botween opposing stralegies. But this cole, which he had played from one crisis to the next over the pust few weeks and months, was losing its effect as the situation On Saturday. # September, the loaderships of the different parties of the left went their separate ways without reaching ans agreement. The split, though kept secret, A further meeting was planned for 11 September, at 9,30 am at the Moneda Palace, to see if a compromise could be reached. It was never to take place.
The meeting on & September has an importance which extends beyond this single occusion, The positions put forward when the crisis was at its sharpest are an extraordinary microcosmi of the whole of the Popular Unity experienc in particular the divisions which ran through it in the last lew months of its existonce, and the total paralysis to which it led, The split un the evening of 8 September-whose details were only too well known hy the generais-led co the fixing of a definite date for the coup, for which detailed plans had already been drawn This split, this crisis, was to totally absorb the attention of the party leaderships between 8 and 11 September. This, as well as their mistaken analyses, meant that they were completely taken by surprise when the coup was launched.
It is enough to give one example of this. In the ranks of the Socialist Party, preparations had been made for a kind of 'state of emergency", In this 'state of emergency" the militants who were members of the "special brigades", arsed groups drawn from the ranks of the party, were supposed to be operational, gathered together and