Arthur M. Schlesingur Jr., 1n his book The Ritter Heritage. Vietorts how: "Stalin liked the idea." In order to preserve his alliance with the US, Stalin was quite prepared to ditch the nationalist forces, then known as the Victinh Not Enthusiastic But the British were not enthus sic about the idea. They were wor med about the effect on their own colonial possessions if France lost So British pressure was appled to the Amencans to restore At the Potsdam conference the US reluctantly accepted the millaty arguments of the British The new US President, Truman, approved the projected division of Vietnam and agreed to allow the British troops of the South East Asia Command to go into Saipon to prepare the way for the return of the French. Stalin did not dissent. The need to preserve the alliance with the imperalists was more important than the brutal division of Vietnam.
The French Communist Party took up this line with fervent enthusiasm. Without hesitation it gave unstinting support to the French war of reconquest in Indochina. Marcel ident of France, was one of the coun ter-signatories authorising the bonhardment oi Haiphong in November 1946. Over 6,000 people were killed in this attack.
Congratulations
On 20 December 1946 all 182 CP deputies in the French National Assemily joined in the sending of congratulations to Leclere and his army for their bloody suppression of the people of Haiphong After all. I Humanite, the daily paper of the French CP, had set the tone of servility to Moscow's line when it wrote on 24 July 1946: Are we, alter hav to lose Indochina tomorros...7 +D7E DuR As the 1939-45 war drew to its close, the Allies began to wrangle over regaining or acquiring new spheres of interest. At the Yalta Conference, US President Roosevelt set his sights on establishing an American influence in South East Asia, and sugThe French CP did everything in its power to make sure France did mously for the Government's military credits budgets in 1945 and 1946. On 26 July 1946 the Frenca CP deputies voted to endorse the constitutional terms of the French Union', which legally upheld the right of the French Government to treat all colonial territories as part of metropolitan France. Even in March 1947 the CP Ministers in the French Governient were still voling solidly for the military budget, must of which was going to the Indochinese war.
The French ruling class was duly grateful to the Communist Party lor Its unswerving allegiance. In the App ropriations Debate in the National Assembly from 14-18 March 1947, the French Premier Ramadier acknowledeed the treachery of the USSR when he said. "In the Indochina question, we have always noted to this day the correct attitude of the Soviet Governnent."
The USSR and its servile allies in the French Cl only dropped their all out support for the French imper jalists after the French CP had been unceremoniously dumped from the cabinel. They had rendered their setvice to French capitalism. The time had come to make way for an open pro-capitalist, pro-US government.
French Smashed By 1954 the Freech were smashed in Vietnam. Their armies had been Touted at Dien Bien Phu. Over two-thirds of the country was in the hands of the Vietminh, and total victory was in sight But imperialism still lad some tricks up its sleeve -two of these being the Moscow and Peking bureaucracics.
Al the Geneva Peace Conference in 1954, the Russians and the Chinese applied enormous pressure on the Vietminh representatives to accepl ing lost Syna and Lebanon yesterday, the division of their country, Spurious promises were made by the impcrialists that free elections would be held within two ycars. The USSR and the Chinese urged the Vietminh to accept this offer.
The Times on 15 July 1954 reported how the Vietminh delegates at Cieneva complained that it was only the pressure of the Chinese Premier Chou En-lai and the Sovier Minister fer Foreign Affams. Molotor, which forced thera to accept less than they could have pained' place. As the American President Dwight Eisenhower explained in his autobiography, Mandare for Change *1 have never talked of corresponded the fighting in 1954, possibly 80 per cent of the population would have voted for Ho Chi Minh one objective - to give the imperialnamese regime. The French puppet pliant American puppet Diem. The confrontation. Appeals by the Vielminh to the USSR and the People's ected by butl countries on the legitimate demands of the mission of both North and South Vieimam into the United Nations.
designed to assure the imperialists existence with the imperialist powers. At the same time it gave formal recopnition to the dismemberment ence of two separate states.
crucial. From 1965 to 1971 the US two and a half Hiroshima bombe a day on Vietnam. The US Seventh Fleet had also enforced a blockade the iberation forces Soviet combat plane which could Nation forces USSR. -The promised elections never look Hanoi with a person knowledgcable in indochinese affins who did nol agree that had elections been held at the time of The election promises had only ists time to re-stainlise the South Viet Emperor Bao Dai was replaced by the stage was being set for another bloody Republic of China for arms were rejFormal Recognition In January 1957, turning its back Vietminh for a unified Vietnam, the ESs & proposed the stesultancous do- enalism This move by the Soviet Union was that it was in favour of peaceful co:
of Vietnam by recognising the existAs the US began to step up its intervention in Vietnam, aid from the USSR and China became even more exploded 26 billion pounds of mun- OUCHALYE Itions in Indochina. By 1972, during the period of Nixon's visit to Moscow, the giant B-52 bombers were raining down the equivalent in explosives of on the North Vietnamese ports, cut ting off vital supplies of materials to In Vietnam the Us was using its best plane, the F-4F. But the Mig-23 have swept the Americans out of the Mao and Kissinger have friendly' chets whilst US bombs rain down on Vietnam.
Stalin agrued at Potsdam that the Franch could go back into Vietnam.
sky was never delivered to the liberThe STYX missiles supplied to the Egyptians by the which could have broken the U5 blockade of the North Vietnamese parts - were aiso denied to The SAM 11 was the best missile sent by the Russians to Vietnam. Desipsed in 195l, it could not be ted ahove 1,000 metres and was totaly inadequate against the B-52s. The much more modern SAM 11 Is and the SA 4 and 5 - supplied by the Russians to Egypt were denied to the Vietnamese liberation forces.
Detente
the /nericans know lull well what the UsSa was -, lol The Pentagon Papers reveal how the US military and political strategists always assessed the likely response of Mascow and Peking before any American escalation in Vietnam, feating that a firm response from them would cost the US more than the war was wort Bat co the bureaucracies the war in Vietnam was nothing more than a bargaining counter in their attemple to secure detente with imp Their responses were coldly calculated. They deliberately kept their supplies of arms at a level just suffic ient to keep the war going. but not cnough to enable the Vietnamese to secure a downright victory.
Indeed, so concerned wete the Russ- bitter note, that the USSR sent me ians that the Vietnamese offensive in 1972 might disrupt Soviet plans for detente that Victor Louis, the Soviet journalist. wrote on 16 June 1972 that the North Vietnamese had tried to undermine the Moscow-Washing ton summit with their South Vietnam The Hial Street Journai reported that during Nixon's Moscow Visit Russian propagandists privately beraled Hanor lot trying to saholage co operation between the superpowers, *National Interests No wonder the Norib Vietnamese accused the Soviet Union of putting its own national interests over chose of the world revolution (quoten in despatch to New York Post, 14 As the Russians were laving out the red carpet for Nixon, the 21 Ma edition of the North Vietnanese Army newspaper Vian Don warned 'Communists... never place private national interests above the commo interests of the world revolution, m Less serve their own national selfish mess. But the call went unheeded. 1 USSR and Peking were more concer ed with derente than the victory of the NLF But the NLF are not the only on in Indochina to have suffered fron lack of Soviet and Chinese support Prince Sihanouk was in Moscow wh the CIA inspired coup pur Lon No into power in Cambodia in Match 1970. In his hook: My War with tie CIA, Sihanouk revcals how the Sor iet leaders sold him down the river The Soviet Premier Kosygin had told him: You can have ahsolule e fidence in the Soviet Union's backir of your struggle. we will always su to the end. But when hanuk arrived in Peking the Russi charge d'opates refused to give his a message of support. As Sihamonk recounts, his Government was rece nised by over 20 states, but not by the Soviet Union.
Embassy
The USSR kept an embassy in Phnot Penh and as Sihanouk says maintained diplomane relations wi the traitor regime. He also adis th cal and surgical equipment to patel up the troops of Lon Nol whom we have put our of action, so they can attack us aguin The real kick in the guts came in October 1971 when the USSR rene ed a fiancial agreement with the 1 Not epime. Just to make sure that the liberation forces did not upset apple curt the USSR advised Sihan to return to the path of peace and neutrality and warned him against tuming the country into a buse for war against neighbouring peoples.
It was only when the Red Khme liberation forces in Cambodia had driven the puppet regime into a sta of complete disarruy that the USSI gave recognition to the FUNK (Nat ional United Front of Cambodia) 1 til then Moscow Radio had describ Shanonk as the former bead of sta of Cambodia, drus conferring forn recognition on Lon Nol as the pres head of state For 30 years Moscow has used t people of Indochina as pawns in a dilly gome of chess. The heroic str prie of these people has been noth more lo them Chso a means crout ing diplomatic pressure on the imp jalists.
The theories of peaceful co-exis ence have been demonstrated in pr tice as bankrupt and counter-revol ionary. They have sided no one hu the imperialists. In Indochina they have resulted in the unnecessary los of countless lives Victory in Indochina coult have been won many yoars ago. But inte national stalinism has delayed that victory, in the interests of a privile burcaucratic caste who prefer to da with the capitalis class rather thus rejy on the revolutionary struggle o the oppressed crasses.
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ble-dealing of the bureaucrats in Moscow and Peking gested that Indochina be set up under a trusteeship'
Thorez, the leader of the French CP and in the post-war years a Vice-Pres
THE INDOCHINESE REVOLUTION has not only had to fight titanic struggles against the military might of the great imperial- ist powers. It has also had to counter the back-stabbing and dou-