IMGpapers 1968–75

Newspapers of the International Marxist Group and its forerunners, 1968–75

THE 12 MAY REFERENDUM ON THE DIVORCE LAWS

Red Weekly No. 49, 25 April 1974 · p. 4 of the scan · 1,076 words

The scan: rw-no49-apr-25-1974.pdf (PDF, Marxists Internet Archive, opens at this page)

Uncorrected machine reading. This text was read by machine (Apple Vision OCR) from a scan of a newspaper page, and the page was cut into articles by machine, at the headlines found by their type size. Nothing has been corrected: expect misread words, text from a neighbouring article, and titles that are the machine reading of the headline, some of them only fragments. Quote from the scan, not from this page.
How this article was cut and titled: headline found by type size in the OCR geometry (split_tabloid.py); 3-6 of 6; machine-segmented newspaper page; uncorrected Vision OCR.

page 4 of the scan

The asked, for the first time since the adoption of the present constitution, to participate in a referendum. The issue at stake will be the law on divorce, which has already been in force for several years and which reactionary groups are now demanding be repealed.

The Christian Democratic Party and the neo-fascist party, the MSI, are for the repeal of the divorce law. On the other side the Communist Party, the Socialist Party, the rightwing Italian Social Democratic Party, the Republican Party, and the Liberal Party are against repeal. Not only is the present coalition Government divided on the issue, but divisions exist within the various parties as well The Catholic Church, while struggling ferociously against divorce, appears undecided. It has always maintained the pseudo-legal fiction according to which 90% of Italians are Catholics, and it fears the loss of prestige if the majority, or a very substantial minority, of these "Catholics' vote for divorce against its advice.

As for the Communist Party, it has always openly proclaimed that it wanted to avoid a referendum: not only because it was scared of vacillations amongst its electoral supporters (and perhaps even amongst its members!), but, above all, because the confrontation over the referendum represents an obstacle for the CP's orientation towards collaboration with the Christian Democratic Party (what the CP's leader Berlinpuer calls the "historic compromise'). This is why Berlinguer and his friends have sought for an agreement right up to the last minute (on the basis of the adoption of a new law on divorce by Parliament), It was not the CP's fault if all its proposals were finally rejected.

We should not underestimate the significance for Italy of an elementary democratic right such as divorce. Not should we overlook the demor aling repercussions which would occur if, after the great mass mobilisations of the last six years, such an acquisition could be quashed by a conservative and reactionary initiative.

But the real stakes are still more important. The 12 May will be a major clash between political forces, and the verdict of the electors will not simply affect divorce but will determine in an umportant way the solution to the Italian political crisis.

It is necessary to deal briefly with the context of the referendum, which i determined by the events of the last few years, Because of the opportunism of the traditional workers parties, and because of the absence of a revolutionary organisation which could intervene as a real political alternative, the Italian bourgeoisie succeeded in overcoming the pre-revolutionary crisis which unfolded in the country during 1969-70. Nevertheless, it was incapable of returning to the relative stability of 1968.

The situation remained extremely unstable and tent with conflicts. The working class did not retreat. The student movement, despite its ups-and-downs, maintained its potential, and large layers of the petit-bourgeoisie remained involved in the wave of radicalisation.

Finally, the bourgeoisie did not succeed in resolving its own crisis of leadersbip! It is this last aspect which is tied most closely to the present because there did not appear any alternative on the left and because, given the relation of forces created by the mass mobilisations, a right wing alternative appeared extremely dangerous.

All attempts to create a reactionary wave failed lamentably and certain initiatives by fascist groupsfor example the attack which led to a massacre in a bank in Milan on 12 December 1969 - rebounded against the reactionaries and against those who had sought to exploit these events.

Certain sections of the ruling class, politically identified with a wing of the Christian Democrats, started to move towards the right in the Spring of 1971. This move corresponded in the first place to the need of the employers to restore order in their house (in other words, to restore their damaged authority and to re-establish a satisfactory rate of profit). It also corresponded to a fear that a prolongation of the unstable situation would help the neofascists make substantial progress, The mounting cconomic crisis placed the workers movement on the defensive, and raised the spectre of redundancies and unemployment. This, at least partially, favoured such RIGHT TURN The clection of Leone at the end of 1971 to the Presidency, on the basis of a right wing bloc, was the first concretisation of this turn. Soon afterwards the centre left coalition Government was replaced by a Government of the centre right, headed by Andreotti.

A second Andreotti Government was formed after new elections, but it continually found itself in an unstable and difficult situation.

The battle around the renewal of the trade union agreements in the most important industrial sectors, especially that of the metal workers, became a major new confrontation in which the Government and the employers-helped by an economic situation which put great pressure on the workers hoped to consolidate their new formula and to wear down the fighting ability of the This six month buttle was even longer than that of 1969. The demands of the unions were in general moderate, and the stubborn resistance of the employers could only be explained by political motives.

But the employen operation suffered a defeat. Their delaying tactics not only failed to break the combativity of the workers but, on the contrary, provoked mobilisations of enormous dimensions (e.g. a demonstration of 250,000 metal workers in Rome in February 1973). In the decisive weeks of the struggle great explosions crupted such as the occupation of Flat-Mirafiori and other factories in Turin. Andreottis centre-right operation was liquidated in favour of a new attempt at a centre-lett coalition-the Rumor government formed in July 1973 crcate serious difficultics for the Government The CP's theory of the "historic compromise, involving a political bloc of Communists, Socialists, and catholics, was launched with a fanfare in the after math of the coup in Chile.

However, the economic expansion was accompanied by an accelerated rate of inflation which rapidly eroded workers' incomes. The petrol crisis made things worse and nullified all the Government's In this situation the unions, always under strong pressure from the base, could no longer maintain the truce. They opened up a new stage of struggles which culminated among other things, in the limited national strike of 27 February.

The Government was again torn by her job. She refused, and was promptly handed her cards.

management.

ament's three-day week.

HAS EXPLODED INTO A GENERAL POLITICAL CONFRONTATION BETWEEN THE WORKING CLASS AND THE BOURGEOISIE

----- pull-quotes -----

CENTRE-LEFT AGAIN

← Police evict Strachan's workersNATIONAL LOCK-OUT →

Something wrong on this page?