This Easter thousands of Irish people will take to the streets to commemorate the Easter Rising of 1916. They will be looking forward, in this year which the Republican Movement has named The Year of Victory, to momentous events which seem to be just around the corner.
The results of the general clection, and the unprecedented escalation in the Provisionals military campaign, have deepened the cloud that hangs over the Sunningdale Agreement, and many Republican supporters now consider that its demise is only a matter of time.
WHITELAWISM
This is despite the fact that they have not had much encouragement from Labour's now Secretary for Ireland, Merlyn Rees. The Labour Government seems to have taken on board the baggage of Whitelawism. Of the seven proposals put to the Commons last Thursday (4 April): only the seventh, the mainten ance of the Sunningdale Agreement, is of any long term impor tance.
Lahour adheres to Sunningdale not just because Merlyn Rees and Stan Orme are the only two Labour MP s prepared to take on the job (although they are), or because both think that the sun shines out of Whitelaw's arsehole (although they do), but because Sunningdale is of immense importance to the British ruling class.
The Sunningdale Agreement is distinguished from previous British strategies (the British Army intervention of 1969, the anti-TRA offensive of July 1970, and interment), by virtue of the fact that it does not seck to achieve an immediate solution lo the problem of violence, Instend, it ties stabilisation in the North to Britain's long term aim ol handing over control of the whole of Ireland to the most stuble hourgeois force in the Island the Southern ruling class, All previous measures Talled, not just because the violence continued, but because they postponed that eventant rutcome Sunninpale has achieved the triple goals of creating a collabotstionist force within the catholic community fin the shape of the SDLP), splitting the loyalist opposition to Britain's long term aims, and creating a medium term possibility of stabilisation Because of this no British government, particularly a Labour one, will lightly throw it aside.
FLAWS IN THE DEAL But this strong conmitment cannot hide the flaws in the deal. For a start the two main partners in the Northern Executive have quite different aims. Like BenJamin Franklin they hang together for fear of hanging separately.
Since direct rule Faulkner's aim has remained relatively con sistent. He wants to keep as much as it possible of both aspects of Unioniss the link with Britain and the protestant ascendancy. He accepts power sharing and if it became politically possible would accept the Council of leeland- but only as necessary evils His real interest in Sunningdale 15 to get sufficient political and economic concessions to weld together a new 'mark twa" Unionist blue. This would be a smaller and somewhat battle worn vetsion, but would embody the same multi-class sectarian character, and rest on the special relationship with Britain.
The SDLP needs power sharing. so that it can appeur to the catholic masses as the distributor of Jobs, houses and opportunities for advancement, But no less. important, it needs power sharing to build a political machine, and it is succeeding. The SDLP now offers a viable career to flocks of young, floral-tied, up and coming catholic professionals.
two examples of what can be achieved by a petty bourgeois political force which pets its hands on governmental power. In the South both the Free Staters in 1922, and Fianns Fail in 1933, succeeded in jacking up their section of the petty-bourgeosie to full bourgeois status, Although I the SDLP has only one handle of the ruthless.
paigns on this scale.
The catholic middle class has seen being imminent. specially picked to be self-reliant and After the war the SAS was almost phased out. It was saved by the spate But despite the determination of its adherents since the turn of the year, the balance has swung seriously against Sunningdale, Against all expectations the Provisional IRA has rebounded from last year's serious losses to launch the tiercest miltary the South campaign ever. On the werkend of 30-31 March they inflicted E10 million pounds worth of damage, with major bombings in Armagh, Bangor and Lisburn. This followed the major coup, the previous weekend, of blowing up the British Army HQ in Koyal Avenue, Belfast.
these explosions was accompanied by the politically damaging loss of Life associated with previous camThe Republicans today are in their most powerful position since the summer of 1972-when they forced the British Government into a short-lived cease-fire, But there are some important differences.
In parely military terms the IRA & much stronger, Its actions are spread over a wider gengraphical area, including the smaller towas, and the border areas. A steady toll of lives has been exacted from the Crown forces. Equipment, training. orgamsation and discipiine are much more developed than two years ago The aim of this campaign is to force the new British Government into another cease-fire and round of negotiations, Irish newspapers are full of speculation about this Rees's proposals bave been interpreted as a hint that he would consider this. The reduction in troop mumbets, the sign-out-aterrorist" scheme, and the legulisa Lion of Sinn Fein could be taken as a step towards the Provos demands. I more effectively pressurise the British and Greek communities, demonstrated that it can gain the electoral support of considerable numbers of catholics, even in the strongest Prove areas. The Provisionals remain anable to develop mass opposition to the deepening collaboration by the Coalition Government in This is serious. It means that the British Government, which still commands considerable military capacity. also has increased political elbow room for manocuvring against the Republicans.
But on the other hand, the British Government is opposed from both ends of the political spectrum. The huge swing to the anti-Sunningdale Unionist in the general election gravely weakens the agreement.
It is nor clear how much this aids the Republicans. Although the election results discredit Sunningdale, they have slowed down other favourable developments within the protestant community.
Prior to tie election a deep despalt had gripped the protestants. The Council of Ireland loomed over them and they saw this as the final sell-out to the South. All methods of resistance had become discredited, and there was serious political tragmentation. In this situation some of the protestant groupings began to think the unthinkable, and to consider discussions with the Republicans.
It is necessary to be careful about this development. No section of the protestancs hroke from sectarianism. All of them, the UDA er di, were trying to safeguard the protestant ascendancy.
A BRIDGE They wished to make some tirrange ment with the Republicans, in order ti With the deepening oconomic