coup some months ago. But they made American planes over Laos - almost one ton for every Lao citizen. From 1971 One of the last major points in the Laotian ceasefire accords signed in February 1973 was resolved a few weeks ago, when representatives of the Pathet Lao insurgents and the pro-imperialist Souvanna Phouma regime agreed to the establishment of a joint police force in the two major cities of Vientiane and Luang Prabang Laos has long been a focus of the struggle in Indochina because of its key strategic position, bordering Vietnam, Cambodia, Thailand, China, and Burma. Over the past 20 years, the US has consistently used every means available to maintain a tochold there.
These means have included attempled sabotage of the Geneva Convention by Dulles in 1954; intensive hombing of the ateas controlled by the Pathet Lao; the forced removal of over half the population to refugee" camps, the instigation of coups and counter-coups; and the transformation of large areas of the country anto an electronic battlefield, so that the once-lush Piain of Jars and Bolovens plateau ate now arid deserts.
In forcing the withdrawal of nearly 300,000 Thai mercenaries and an end to all US bombings, the ceasefire thus removed a massive obstacle from the path of the liberation forces. It also left the Pathet Lao in sole control of three-quarters of the country and over half the population, Furthermore, it guaranteed the release of all civilsan prisoners and the right of the 'refugees" to return freely to their The importance of the ceascfire was that it firmly fixed the balance of forces in Laos in favour of the Pathet Lao, It also marked a change in emphasis, with a period of political activity and consolidation replacing the previous dominance of the mustary strugzle. This is summed up in two major items of the accords.
COALITION The first deals with the formation of a "national' government, for which agreement was reached in September, The political wing of the Pathet Lao, the Neo Lao Hak Xat (NLH), will hold half of the posts in this government.
Together with this it was agreed to hold national elections for the Assembly. The NL.H will also have the right to carry out open political agitation without any hindrance from the present regime.
The importance of these clauscs is sclf-evident. The problem lies in the programmatic position of the NLH, which envisages the Laotian revolution as proceding in a series of stages-the stage of anti-imperialist struggle now being formally over, Refugee holds up US fragmentation bomb of type which blinded and maimed him with a 'national' (classless) government now necessary to precede a scries of peaceful reforms which will homelands (in liberated areas, mainly). finally usher in socialism.
The falsity of this line has already heen amply demonstrated -in the CABECS OT TEC HITA CO ZOnGA WELTE expropriation of the landowners and collectivisation of the land has been necessary to consolidate the revolutionary base; in the history of the war, where workers and peasants united under the NEH have faced the feudal reminants, nascent bourgeoisie and pro-imperialist hureaucrats in open class confrontation; and in the Phouma regime and the US.
Last October saw the first-ever general strike in Latembourg. Although ir lasted Nevertheless, the formation of a coalition is important for two reasof a renewed US intervention by Sccondly, it crystallises the weaknesses and emphasises the divisions amongst the Laotian right, no credible "Third Force' in Laos, And, as would he expected, the divided amongst themscives, The factions fall into two main groups, neither of which has any mass base.
The first is largely composed of and likes to call itself "neutralist'Pathet Lao zones. This group has accepted the coalition agreement, not because of any sudden love for the Pathet Lao, but largely because fer this arrangement to the possible alternative of a complele Pathet Lao take-over.
The other main group is even further to the right, consisting of militarists and bourgeois clements has flowed in during the crisis, and no move, since the US had made it clear that it would give no backing to a right-wing adventure which could lead to a re-escalation of the fighting during the present domestic crisis in the States.
It was this split in the Laotian to accept the ceasefine in the first place. This in turn has accelerated the decay of the old regine.
tiane and the royal capital Luang Prabang, with each side stationing continued links between the Souvanna an qual number of troops and police in the two cities. It was this which ons. Firstly, it reduces the possibility removing any possible pretest for it.
In contrast to Vietnam, there is throughout Laos, right-wing-the old ruting clique-are bureaucrats around Souvanna Phouma, an image difficult to sustain since between the casefire and July it ordered several hundred air strikes against its instinct for survival leads it to pre who have grown fat on the aid which who are therefore more threatened by a period of stability. It was this group on whom General Thang Ma relied for support when he launched his abortive right which allowed Souvanna Phouma on Laos-in 1954 T he second major item of the accords CIA, resulting in grave serbacks concerns the neutralisation of VienThe proposal lo caclude members and of NLH ministers (in 1962 one was assassinated and the other imprisoned), tation of the accords is taking and it prevents either of the citics, still nominally held by the reactionaries, from being used as a counterrevolutionary base. It further avoids the need for the P'athel Lao to take them by force, and symbolises the dual power situation which exists It can also, of course, be expected that the presence of so many armed and hardened Pathet Lao cadre in the cities will have a beneficial effect in shifting the allegance of the troops and urban masses towards support Between 1964 and 1972 about two and a half million bombs were dropped by B-52 bombers like the one above were used on villages in the Plain of Jars to make this formerly fertile region completely uninhabitable.
of the Neo Lao Hak Xat.
LESSONS LEARNT It seems certain that the Pathet Lao have learnt a number of lessons from the two previous agreements and 1962 which were both sabulaged by the for the liberation forces. This time, they have kept their liberated zones wholly intact, as well as insisting on the dismantling of the Vientiane administration and its non-recognition David Johnson further point is that the implemenplace very slowly. This is not at all because of any manoeuvrings by Souvanna Phouma: but on the contrary because the leadership of the NIH are this time exercising great caution, making sure each step is first consolidated before moving on to the next one While there are thus many reasons for optimism over the future of Laos, it should nevertheJess be remembered that the US is still a factor for as long as it contines to hold the purse-strings. This year it is scheduled to pump no less than $300 million of military aid and 348 millien of economic aid into the pockets of Souvanna Phouma and his cronies.
The fate of Laos is still therefore closely bound up with the fate of the whole Indochinese revolution, and its further progress is integral to that of Vietnam and Cambodia That is a point which must never be Forgotten by the worki-wide SLIETEE JEON IEGELE All the militants have agreod to respect trade union discipline and democratie decision-making in this strugale against excluding evolutionists, which is a stroggle for worker' democracy in the trade unions. Given the unfortunate lack of democratic discussion inside the union we must today call oo all dodicated workers and trade unionists in Luxemboorg and in Europe to protest energetically aanst thc union leaders manoeuvres to divide the workers" movement,