Everyone knows about the war in Ireland, but very few know much about Britain's long-standing military presence in Oman, and her leading role in the struggle against the guerrillas of the Popular Front for the Liberation of the Occupied Arab Gulf (PFLOAG). The present oil crisis obviously gives this British foothold in the area an added importance. Below, in an article condensed from the January issue of the "Gulf Bulletin", we take a closer look at what the army is up to. In the last few years, Oman has heen the only place in the world outside the State borders of the UK (ie Northern Ireland) in which the army of the British State has been involved in live Fighting. It is the only other colonial war in which the British have been directly involved since the defeat of British intervention in South Yemen ('South Arabia' and "Aden' as. they called it) in 1967.
In the atrogant jargon of British officers, Oman is the 'only place where a young officer can put into practice the training he has received at Sandhurst and Mons', In terms of the global strategy of imperialism, it is the only place outside Ireland where the young repressive cadre of the British State can implement and perfect their lechniques.
The Irit millary presence in Uman began during the Napoleonic Wars and was gice permanent form in the 1870a British intervention was based on the stratcele necd to defend the chunt Sultans of Muscal on the Omani coast - both against rebel tribes in the Interior and against rival imperialist powers-as a mcans of defending British inlerests in India, and prodomin antly Indian troops were used.
However a serious uprising in the Omani interior during World War I forced the British to dig in around Muscat In 1920 the British-officored Muscat Levy Corps was set up, based on the local Arah tribes and recruits from impoverished arcas of Baluchistan (now part of Pakistan) across the sca.
OIL COMPANIES During World War I military intervention went a stago further: the British Sout Unar Kommel would con quer Egypt led them to build a string of bases through Central Alica, ang ine link wise in a wear troupe Oman, where four airfields were built -at Salala, Masirah Island, Azaibah, and Muscat Though hardly osed at the time they water proved wery uscrut woon the invasion of inner Oman by the oil compunies lod to a full-scale uprising which lasted from 1955 to 1959, Several hundred Briosh troops were sent in. and the Sultan's army was expanded.
The British, realising that provinus arrangeltients were inadequate, then sigiod new agreement with the Saltin: under an Exchange of Letters' in July 1458, the British apreed "to extend assistance towards the strengthening or Your Highness's Anny. Her Majesty's Governmont will also, at Your Highness's request, make available regular offices on socondment from the British Army, Who wit, while sortg in the Sultanate, form an integral part of Your Highness's Armed Forces". The British also agreed to provide training facilities and to help the Sultan build an air force MYTH OF "SECONDMENT' Today the Omani army is based on this structune. All top posts in the army are hekd by Brilish offers scconded from the British army: the Defence Minister, Commander-in-Chief of the Army, Head of Intelligence, Commander of the Air Farce and so on are all officials of the British State. Aucording to official British fipires about 200 seconded officers were serving in the Sultan's Armed Forces (SAF) and Sultan of Oman's Air Force (SOAF) in 1973. But this figure understates the real situation, just as the myths of "secondment try to obscure the fact that the Omani army" and the povernment of the Sultanate are in reality Little more than extensions of the British State The real figures are made up of the secondod" officers nius several other categories. First, there ase tho "contract" (ie mercenary) officers, former members of the British armed forces working for the Sultan and formally not part of the British State apparatus, although they are about as independent of it as the US army's civilian advisers" in Indochina. Secondly. there are British forces not officially seconded but only "training: A 100man British Army Training Team made up of memhers of the SAS counter Insurgency regiment was claimed to be not on active service but only training, however, the British said that "if fired upon they would defend themsches, and "they were socking calistic training situations" In fact they were an offensive military unit.
Thirdly, thore an: British personnel allegedly not in action but only "defending the Salala" hase: memhers of the spacial defensive unit, the RAf Regiment, they are again formally excluded but in reality included in the military apparatus of the British Sale in Omen. Panally fand most numerous) Beneare the British military personnel not directly deplay: cd in the combat arca of souget canals emoter Such are the RAP personnel on the island base of Masirah- since SAF and SOAF make unim poded us: of thee facilities, the distinesion has no practical This partially concealed British miscary presence Is the core of the Omani army, which since the carly 1960s has grown from 3,000 to about 10,000 in total strength But for domatic and international reasons the British are reluctant to commit more than a certain number of troops to Oman. Moreover, after overthrowing Sultan Said and installing his son Oahus in his place in 1970, they decided that the best way to legitimise the new ruler was to involve other Arab states, This led to the arival shortly aftorwards of sevetal Jordanian intelligence officers, specialising in torture and in appeals to the "Islamic" sentiments of the population against the "infidels" of the Popular Front. Saadi money was also funnelled in, and some Saudi officers paid at least temporaty visits to the combat zone, Pakistan, which provides most of the pilots for the Saudi, Kuwaiti and Abu Dhabi air forues, also started to provide military personnel to officer the SAF. India, mcanwhile, began to train the new Omani navy. Finally Iran, the new guardian of capitalism in the Gulf, sent bundreds of counterinsurpency helicopter personnel into Dhofar to back up the Shab's boast that iran will not tolcrate subversion' on the Arab side of the Gulf.
This use of different kinds of local support cun be seen in two ways: as a continuation of the old 19th century use of 'native' troops to make up for the lack of British troops; and as a verdon of the imperialist strategy exemplified in "Vietnamisation", where the direct use of imperialist troops is avoided because of the possible political consequences, both in the country under attack and in the impenalist country itself, This latter aspect of the probiem also has the advantage that some of the other states in the region are implicated in the specific repression: the use of Korean, Australian and New Zealand personnei in Vietnam followod a similar pattern.
COUNTER-INSURGENCY Overall British strategy in Dhofar can also be seon as a mixture of old and new style counter trying to smash the liberated areas by: (a) cutting their supply lines; (b) destraying their food sounts calle wheat cockle, kaung or terrorising memoers of the civilian population until they are propared to be 'resettled', in driven into concentration camps under government control. In contemporary sargon. this involves splitting the people from the hard core. the core ocise assumed to ce communists socie how separate from the nathe population.
This policy has, however, unpther side under Lie on the cone a pabicy of annihilation is being carced out. Villages have been hurnt down wells blown up. animals killed, cropt burnt from the groand and from the air; white long rangu artillers bombardmcat or "suspectad rebel areas futfils a similar fane lion.
The ose of sir power Conned the basis of British colonial controt in lag, South Yensen, and Somalia: and is importance in the armoury pt wapenass tacticians has most dramatically been shown by the Americans in Vietnam. In Dholar, air power is ord for reconnaissance, flying supplies le outposr, nomh ing gaerrilla areas, and tactical sopport to SAF post. ions under line, The busic of the force are 15 or so pizues (Skyven, Caribou, Viscoanti and helicoplers.
These use lown by RAF personnel plus some merceraries, and are serviced by Alreons Ltd.
Beczuse of the intensity of guerrills fire they have, however, had to limit their activities: holicopters new fly at around 9,000 feet 5,000 feet above the mour Lains-and the short-range Skyvon transport planes and only able to laed forvery hriel porlods at the desert airstrips. Throughout the ming seasan lame L 4.
G to September -reconnaissance is impossible becaus of the thick cloud that overhangs the Dhold oun tains. But it is not inconcowable, though never admit ted, that in other periods CS spy satellites have been used to photograph the area Toe additional reconnais sance material.
Another key aspoct of British counter-insurecacy is 'psychological warfare". Salala radio and leuflets dropped over guerrilla areas appeal to the population to surrender, tell them of people who are alleged to have done so, threaten them with death with puctures of graves marked "This One is For You", and so on A constant stream of propaginda tells of the wondrous doings of the new Sultan.
For those who are captured, a different kind of psycholopical war lies in store: modern intertogation methods, inchiding the use of desorientation tochniques, sleep deptivation, and mental torture. This set of intelligence techniques was developed by the British in the string of colonial wars after 1945, and has now heen well documented in ireland.
The ideology of the British persornel in Oman summarises the nature of the war chere: since a majority of the personnel are officers, or in the spocial elite regiments like the SAS, there is none of that proletarian cynicism which has marked the presence of the British army in otbur colonial areas Here the dominant world-view Is Sandhurst anti communism, itself a modley of dreams of Empire and modern counter-insurgency. Helping the Sultan to fight Communist aggression", they started it, we dider ant commion justifications There is also a personal aspect, derived from Bie contemporaty contractice or the British army: Dhofar offers a kind of experience for the belligerent young imperialists that caenot be found elscwhen Running Your own show" the job is the park", and tbe only place in the world where an Enpostman is shif chlled ah, have hees quoted as subjective aspects of the molivations of Betish officers of the Bestish any is the indifference of the British working class mor sment to this war. The passac com plicity of the British populption, a product of centuries of imperialist wars, forms the meressary itcological backdrop la the Omani intervention, Bur things ar beginning to change now with the impact of the wa in Ireland, the Hosthrow manoeuvres the Ircatched use of traopk as strikebreakers, and so on. Exposing the setlvities of the British anny in Oran wil he an cen tial part at deepening this process of anderstassile of Stukemaster BAC-167 fightergets, backed by transport the relationship between the State and in armed bodie CE MET.
The Gulf Bulletin is apoladie, pree 10 p. Fron:
The Giff Commiter, cio ICDP, 6 Endaleten Stee London NCi:
Guerrillas of the Popular Front for the Liberation of the Occupied Arab Gulf — they are steadily gaining ground despite all the techniques of counter-insurgency employed by the British army