MIR militants demonstrate before the coup these were immediately shot! At least a dozen incidents have been reported, directly or indirectly. There must in that case have been many more.
This makes work in the army exceedingly difficult, indeed almost impossible in some cases. On the other hand, if there was a political and military offensive by the revolutionaries, and accepted a shift system that required them to do all their work at night and on weekends, then they could get a 35 hour week and 4 weeks holiday: but only in exchange for agreeing to no wage rise at all over the next year.
Agreements can be made for extra money to be paid out to reduce the differential hetween men and women by up to 50%, Since this differential was supposed to have been reduced by a third already under Phase 2, this in volves no stepping up of increases.
Moreover, Phase 3 sows up an important loophole which some workers tried to take advantage of under Phase 2: money available under the pay limit could he used to give bisger increases to the men, and then money could be claimed for the women under the equal pay provisions to narrow the differen tials back down again, Under the new regulations, If any of the money from an increase within the pay limits is used to widen the differential between men and women, then no money at all can be granted under the equal pay clauses.
FLEXIBILITY The Texibility' of Phase 3 is a smokescreen: a little leeway is haing allowed in order to tighten up the provisions of the pay laws overall. There is little that workers can get under the new flexible" Phase 3 that they have not been able to get under Phase 2 by exploiting various loopholes.
If the working class movement does not organise immediately to smash Phase 3, the working class will fare no better in the next Twelve months than they have in the past nine months. At the best that will mean a stagnant standard of Living Many will suffer a decline. All around there will be bitter in-fighting within the working class movement to decide who will lose out and who will just stand still Chris Balfour NEXT WEEK-A MILITANT'S GUIDE TO PHASE 3 ON PRICES AND PROFITS which really seemed to provide an alternative, there can be no doubt that a considerable number of NCOs and soldiers would be on our side. On several occasions, during the searches, soldiers, NCOs and even officers have, let us say, closed their eyes to the discovery of arms: all we ask is that you don't use them against us:
In this particular situation, we therefore intend to avoid in the coming period actions which could help to strengthen the unity of the armed forces; and we will work to multiply the number of modest but significant examples of resistance in the ranks of the army. You talk about the perspectives for work, of a political and military offensive by the revolutionaries, but one of the most striking features is the lack of any visible sign of such an offensive....
That's true. At least at the level of visible evidence, as you say. But we must be clear on this point: because of the weight of reformIse illusions, above all because of the short. sighted policies of the reformist leaderships. the Chilean workers have lost a battle, and paid a very heavy price for it.
On the day of the coup, the workers gathered in large numbers at the places of work which had been occupied in many cases for several weeks, In many factories they put up an heroic resistance, retreating step by step in face of the military's determination to take back the factories". Bur the balance of forces was too much against them. The military were armed to the teeth with modern equipment, often using lanks and sometimes air raids. Against this the workers were very poorly armed, hardly at all in some cases, The military were a co-ordinated and centralised force, carrying out a detailed plan prepared in advance. The workers of the different factories, of the different cordons, were not centralised there was not even any co-ordination among them. Nevertheless it took almost five days, sometimes more to put the Santingo industrial cordons out of action.
In the provinces, events generally developed in much the same way. This explains the large number of deaths during the first days. In certain places there was a virtusl massacre. In one of the most important factories in Santiago, they removed more than 200 bodies, In such a situation, a retreat was inevitable You would describe the present situntion us one of withdrawal rather than of defeat?
fighting at their posts, fruit.
in a personal capacity. lett entirely to their own devices. responsibilities?
period.
Absolutely, for in spite of the extraordinary experienced.
number of victims, the repression was not exactly selective in most cases. That is something which you should be aware of, and which should be publicised abroad: a large number of militants, trade union and political leaders, died But the revolutionary organisations, and our own in particular, were not crippled. Despite heavy losses, our main structures, the main body of our apparatus, are absolutely intact. In this we simply acted in line with our analysis, tion, the members of the Communist Party are and the measures which we took have borne How about the other organisations of the left, particularly the parties of Popular Unity?
Although I have been in contact with militants of the Communist Party, the Socialist Party. and MAPU (the Movement for United Popular Action), I will speak cautiously and, let us say, As far as MAPU is concerned, and although it is only a small organisation, I think one can say that it too has escaped with relatively little damage to its organisational structures.
As for the Communist Party, It seems that many local leaders have disappeared or have been arrested. One thing is cleur: the base of the parly, purticulurly in Santiago, is completely in the kind of Revolutionary Front we are pro disoriented: at a single stroke all their illusions posing. an the possibelity of a peaceful road to socialism have heen shattered. Whut is more, the structures any case we have no illusions; the struggle of the Communist Party seem to have been severely dislocated, and although the leaders of the CP took part in the fighting in the cordons, a large number of militants are today without any precise directions and have been With the Socialist Party the situntion-is relative ly complicated because of the very complexity of the currents running through the party when it was in power. The structure of the Socialist Parly did not prepare it for this kind of situsnon. But many militants, and rovolutionary currents in the ranks of the Socialist Party witch had their own organised structures and leaderships, have survived che repression and are preparing for the struggles to come. There again, we have a very great responsibility. How does the MIR plan to shoulder chese We are for the establishment of a Revolutionary enemy. Froat which we think shouid consist of the Popular Unity parties and ourselves. The task of this front should be to prepare the counter-offensive as quickly as possible against the present regitie, a political but abose all a military counter-offensive.
We hope that this front will see the light of day very soon, We will make every possible effort in this direction. We also intend, after the necessary discussions and debates in our own ranks, to propose a proper political and military plan for the front which can help to make this counter-offonsive successful. But such a front must have a clear orientution and draw an adequate balance sheet of the past In this sense, such a front for us will be the framework in which, while maintaining the greatest possible unity of action, we will continue to struggle more than ever against the reformism whose consequences the Chilean workers have just so tragically As it is, even the establishment of such a front challengos reformist-type conceptions.
The Communist Party members with whom we have had some preliminary discussions on this topic may agree with us on the idea of unity, even of unity with us (which is something new); but while they may agree on the need for a rapid counter-offensive to prevent the present confusion among numerous sections from turning into a thoroughgoing demoralisa.
not in such agrecment on the aims and charac ter of such a front.
Some of them defended and will always defend the idea of a larger front including certain other layers opposed to the military. Concretely, their perspective would be to include sections of the Christiun Democracy, If not the whole Christian democracy, in such a front. It is an old approach, classical, which flows from the policies always advocated by the Communist Party in the Popular Unity government: an alliance with Christian Democracy against the right and the tascistic extreme-right. Today it would appear that the Communist Party, under pressure from many of its militants including almost all those in the Communist Youth, has changed its mind in the last few days and will ugree to take part But further upsets cannot be excluded, and in aglinst reformism, in the framework of such a front or some other structure, rerains and will remain for a long time one of our main tasks, We are optimistic on this score. In any case, without indulging in too much speculation, it is obvious that after the ex perience which the Chilean masses have gone through, there will he big upheavals on the left and a significant regroupment. And as far as we are concerned, we are decidediy optimistic on this level. It & true that thesc upheavals will not take place as a result of spontancous conclusions drawn by the masses trom the experience of the coup. They will depend essentially on the ability of the van guard sections to provide a response, in practice, in action, and as quickly as possible, to the situation. They will depend on the sanguard's ability to strike blows at the But there again, what I have said about our organisation leads us to be optimistic.
Red Wieldy 12 October 1973 Page 5
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