IMGpapers 1968–75

Newspapers of the International Marxist Group and its forerunners, 1968–75

So much for "Vietnamisation" Catch 22 in Indo-China

The Red Mole Vol. 2, No. 7, 22 April 1971 · p. 12 of the scan · 768 words

The scan: v02n07-apr-22-1971.pdf (PDF, Marxists Internet Archive, opens at this page)

Uncorrected machine reading. This text was read by machine (Apple Vision OCR) from a scan of a newspaper page, and the page was cut into articles by machine, at the headlines found by their type size. Nothing has been corrected: expect misread words, text from a neighbouring article, and titles that are the machine reading of the headline, some of them only fragments. Quote from the scan, not from this page.
How this article was cut and titled: headline found by type size in the OCR geometry (split_tabloid.py); 1-2 of 2; machine-segmented newspaper page; uncorrected Vision OCR.

page 12 of the scan

If che Nixon administracion is to maintain forces had been driven out of Laos only co its political power in Indo-China ir needs at find themselves harassed and ambushed at Khe least half a million men. But if Nixon keeps Saah irself. The battle of Highway 9, the peak half' a million men in South-East Asia, fighting of "Vietnarisaton", has proved to be its nadir. a war, che consequent U.S. casalties and the The new American strategy has failed its financial cost will hasten the insernal descru- most crucial rest. Carch-22 in Indo-China ction of America and will lose Nixon the reasserts itself. Washington musr now face up November 1972 presidential election. That's to rhe failure and will seek a new solucion of the Cacch-22 in Indo-Chuna. a qualitatively different character. One poss "Vietnamisacion" was ta be the way out of ibility is that the political will of che American chis double bind. Raise Saigon's puppet troops leaders will have been so weakened that a ¡AR VIco a million men, Reduce the U.S. genuine withdrawal will begin. THe second Armed Forces to a residual' 200,000 men possibility is that of escalation combined providing AR.VN with transport, raining. with fake troop withdrawals, a vital fact to communications, artillery and air suppport, deceive American public opinion. Escalation plus ground protection for the U.S. enclaves could take the form of increased bacteriand airmobile divisions for serious emergen- alogical warfare, for example the introduction cies. ARVN would carry the ground combat of anthrax or the bubonic plague. It could even burden and the Pencagon would run the war take the form of tactical nuclear weapons, of machines. As Ambassador Bunker put it. particularly against "the road to the front. they would 'change the colour of the corpses. Tr could take the form of a buid up over the Total costs of the American committment mosths to renewed full-scale bombing of would be reduced because of the fall in North Vietnam, including the supply lines to manpower as the war became capital focensive.

The Bartle of Highway 9 was to be the peat China and the port of Haiphong.

believe we shall sce an escalation, and that of "Vietnamiation", THis highway runs from the most likely form is "bombing the Norch", Quang Tri on the South Vietnamese coast It could well be accompanied by a smokejust below the Demibcarised Zone, to Khe screen such as a call for a coral unconditional Sanh on the Vier-Lao boeder through to Sepone cease-fire or an expanded peace conference. le in Soucber Laos and on westwards towards the is now clear chas in che decisive year that lies Mekong river. Final arrangements for the oper- ahead, when new strategies are being intro ation were made by General Abrams and Laird duced and couprer-strategies sought for, the when he visited Saigon during January, At the main ally of the Indochinese outside of Asia, end of the mooch the U.S. Air Fosce began a isthe Western anti-war movement, chiefly that massive airlift of men and maserial into Quang of the American people. The time has come, Tri and the operational beadquarters ac Khe and che time is crucial, for renewed efforts in Sanh. Britain against the war and againse British The U.S. Saigon carget was to forge across che complicity in it-through agitational-propa 50 kilometres oFchick jungles and mountains propagaoda work, vwid small-scale actions, separating Khe Sanh from Sepone in paly meetings, and demonstrations, like that on 4 days. It al lud gone well the second rarger April 24ch in London. Seize the cine! was to be Savannakhet on che Mekong where the Thai and Caotian borders meet. The strategic objectives were firse to disrupt the road to the front, the supply Enes renning from North Vietaam down into Southern Laos, Cambodia and finally South Vietnam; second, to capture the arms and food depots scattered throughout the trail complex, third, to enguge and defeat che units of the Pathet Lao and che Narth Frank Pais Vietnamese Army in the area. For these purposes Washington and Saigon had brought togecher 45.000 troops. 2000 aircraft Tinel uding 800 helicopters) 300 canks and armoured personnell carriers and, 250 cannon. The Battle of Higaway 9 was to become the most violent single conflict in the whole history of the Indochinese wat.

20,000 elite Saigon troops, including the "paras", the Marines and the Rangers began the invasion on February Sch, accompunied by a small number of U.S. troops, To the north and south of be highway, fire bases were sot up by heliporced troops. These bases, along with with the Indochinese revolution

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