10% of the firms whose value in output was Rs.2m. and over, contributed as much as 82.8% of total output". Large plants are often too big for the small market altogether, and thus there is considerable under-utilisation of capacity. Rough estimates put the margin of unused capacity in Ceylonese light industry at about 60% In steel, wire, tubes and tyres, under-utilisation is much greater. In addition, imported plants and techniques are often unadapted to resource availabilities, particularly the socio-economic conditions of Ceylon. Buddhadasa Hewavitharana has called attention to the effects of this on unemployment in Ceylon (in 1970-71 out of a total labour force of 3.25m. some 700,000 were unemployed and the situation is undoubtedly worsening).
There is still another consequence of the attempts at industrialisation. Since supplies for industry have to be imported, the attempt at industrialisation has increased the need for foreign exchange, which is also used to buy rice imports for a rising population. About ¾ of the raw materials req uired for Ceylonese industry originate from foreign sources, and this pattern of raw material utilisation has remained static in the period 1966-1970. Since, as we have seen, it has proved impossible to increase export earnings, a resource gap has emerged which has been filled by resort to 'aid" and other borrowing. But this 'aid' and borrowing has proved to be less and less helpful as interest and capital repayments mount up. Aid flows increased by about Rs.60m. each year since 1967 to reach about Rs.460m. in 1970 and short term borrowing from abroad rose from Rs.187m. in 1967 to Rs.297m in 1968 and then Rs.663m. in 1969. And then the chickens started coming home to roost: "It is estimated that capital repayments will rise from Rs.390m. in 1969 to Rs.580m. in 1970 and Rs.963m. in 1971" In addition, the National Income Accounts give some idea of the trend in the outflow of income with respect to all foreign capital (short and long term, public and private) - they shoot up particularly after 1968, from Rs.60.5m. to Rs.153.6m. in 1970. How much long term help this aid is can be assessed from the trend in the ratio of debt servicing charges to foreign exchange earnings. In 1966 debt servicing was running at 5.96% of such earnings, and by 1969 it was 12.42%.
CONCLUSION This brief article has not attempted to analyse in detail the problems of the Ceylonese economy. What it has attempted to show is that imperialism has structured Ceylon's economy to its own benefit and to the detriment of the Ceylonese. More specifically, imperialism profits from the difficul ties of Ceylon, it gains from the fall in the prices of primary commodities and in the long run is able to avoid the disadvantages of this by pulling out its own capital. It gains from the attempts at industrialisation since this provides a market for the producer goods of the imperialist countries - even though these are ill-adapted to Ceylonese conditions and distort Ceylonese development. Finally imperialism gains from a limited decay in the Ceylonese economy because Ceylon is forced to become the debt slaves of international bankers. After all under capitalism you can make profits out of most things - including unsuccessful revolutions. The C.S.C. was set up in Britain at the time of the brutal crushing of the insurrectionary youth of the J.V.P. (Peoples Liberation Front). From its inception at a meeting in April 197l, the C.S.C. was conceived as a United Front of organisations and groupings coming together in solidarity with the revolutionary struggle of the Ceylonese masses against the armed power of the Bandaranaike regime and of Ceylonese and foreign capital.
RELEASE ALL POLITICAL LANU O TER AL LAND OF TEA CLYLON TERROR C.S.C. picket of London Tea Centre, April 1972 The C.S.C has produced three issues of its Ceylon Solidarity Bulletin* since the beginning of the year. In No.l much information is produced in the form of letters and documents from Ceylonese citizens, showing the injustices being carried out and the widespread opposition to the policies of the Bandaranaike government. In No. 2 the implications of the Criminal Justice Commissions Act are drawn out, and in No. 3 there is an analysis of the new Sri Lanka Constitution, together with news of solidarity campaigns in Australia, Japan, Canada and the United States.
*which may be obtained from the C.S.C., 9 Dennington Park Mansions, N. W.6. RED MOLE Name:
Address:
Money Orders to Red Mole, 182 Pentonville Road, London N.I.
EDITORIAL COMMITTEE: Tariq Ali, Robin Blackburn, Peter Gowan, Alan Jones, Martin Meteyard, John Weal, Judith White.
DISTRIBUTION: Phil Sanders Published by Relgocrest for The Red Mole, 182 Pentonville Road, London N.1. 01-837 6954 Printed by F.l. Litho (T.U.) Ltd., 182 Pentonville Road, London N.1. 01-837 9987
----- pull-quotes -----
SUBSCRIBE! I enclose £1.50/£3.00 for 6/12 months.